The first section outlines the system of property qualifications for the vote from 1430 to 1884, two views of the justification for property qualifications, and the procedure by which disputes concerning these qualifications were decided. Second, the 'Littleton rule'-the rule the Supreme Court in Mexfield thought it was applying-is explained, as is a particular problem for that rule in relation to property qualifications for the vote. The third section introduces James Manning and places 8 were the boroughs, towns and cities which had been made parliamentary constituencies in past centuries; the borough franchise was enormously varied. It was always clear that a freehold interest in land could mean many more things than a fee simple; a huge range of interests were capable of being freeholds. 20 Saliently, life tenancies were always understood to be freeholds. On the other hand, studies of actual constituencies show a 'widespread lack of clarity' as to what exactly constituted a freehold; in practice, the question of whether or not someone had a freehold interest in land, such as to qualify him for the vote, seems to have been primarily a matter of local understandings. 21 The main reason for this lack of clarity was that, down to 1832, disputes as to a voter's qualification could only be decided after a contested election and could not be decided in the ordinary courts. 22 For much of English history and large parts of the country, uncontested elections were the norm. 23 It was widely believed that there ought to be informal assessment and agreement as to who should represent the constituency, such that a contested election represented a failure-even, in an early nineteenth-century opinion, a manifestation of 'Original Sin.'
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If there were a contested election, people who believed themselves entitled to vote just turned up at the polls. If some were turned away, or some who were believed not to be qualified actually voted, this could only be challenged by a petition to Parliament challenging the result of the election, and the petition would be decided by a committee of the House of Commons. 25 These committees did not consider themselves bound by precedent and often lacked legal expertise; put more bluntly, by 20 The First Reform Act, the Representation of the People Act 1832, famously expanded the franchise; in the counties, the main effect was that, for the first time, some tenants other than for life and some copyholders got the vote. 27 But the Act also introduced voter registration. Roughly, the process in the counties was that, every year, unless they were already registered and their qualification was unchanged, would-be voters had to submit a claim to be registered, including a brief description of the property and the interest in it by which they claimed to be qualified. 28 The draft lists would then be made public, and anyone could submit an objection to any name on the list. The burden of proof was then on the claimant to prove his qualification, before a new sort of judicial officer created by the Act, a 'revising barrister', who would hold hearings in the constituency.
Under the 1832 Act, appeals from revising barristers' decisions went to The consequence of this history was that the opposite of a freehold was a tenancy at will. Maitland describes the concept of freehold as arising from the contrast with unfree, or villein, tenure: a tenant whose obligations were not clearly specified was unfree, because he was subject to the will of his lord. 40 As for incorporeal freeholds, it had always been possible to grant or convey these by deed, and the law eventually evolved to allow the same for corporeal freeholds. 47 Use of a deed made it easy to apply the Littleton rule, given the rule's flip side: one can just about imagine saying 'Enter into this house, and God give you joy of it' even to an intended tenant at will, but no one would use a deed to create a tenancy at will.
However, a difficulty for the Littleton rule arose when an 'equitable freehold' 
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This was unproblematic where, for example, the terms of a trust expressly gave a beneficiary a life tenancy, even if determinable: that was plainly the equitable equivalent of a legal freehold. But, if the terms of the trust created an interest expressed only to terminate on an uncertain event, it was unclear whether one could apply the Littleton rule at all or, if so, how-given that, on the face of it, the rule appeared to require the formalities necessary to create a legal freehold. and one could do that in a more or a less restrictive way, either insisting on a clear intention to create a determinable life interest or merely requiring that there be no clear intention that the interest be terminable at the grantor's will.
The question was eventually resolved in favour of the second option, and in its less restrictive version-but only through a debate started by James Manning, who proposed and promoted an extreme version of the first option, purportedly backed by a formidable array of ancient sources.
JAMES MANNING
In order to understand why Manning proposed the sort of rule he did, and how he came to be in a position to promote it so effectively, we need to consider his
background, and what it meant in terms of his place in legal society and political culture.
Manning was born in 1781, the son of a Unitarian minister in Exeter; he was called to the Bar at Lincoln's Inn in 1817, but had already 'acquired an early familiarity with history, antiquities, and European languages.' 49 Pollock described
Manning as the 'one man' who more than any other 'revived the study of' the Year Books, the closest thing we have to case reports before the mid-sixteenth century. hard to imagine any practical difference between a tenancy at will and a tenancy for life subject to determination at the landlord's will. A difference could however arise in the context of nineteenth-century property qualifications.
Finally, Manning's decision in the case before him is illuminating:
'the building appears to be the private property of fourteen persons, who hold it subject to no trust, and who allow it to be used as a place of worship, merely because, and so long as, they think it proper to do so. Manning's lengthy reasoning and scholarship were therefore unnecessary to his decision; he plainly wanted to get his proposed rule into the public domain for its own sake.
Hayes on Conveyancing (1840)
Two years later, Manning's proposed rule was published in a popular land-law textbook, 'Hayes on Conveyancing'. In the fifth edition, Hayes inserted nearly the whole of Manning's 1838 judgment as a footnote running to nearly five pages.
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Hayes introduces it by saying, 'The following extract from a decision by Mr Manning 
Wynne v Wynne (1840) 2 M&G 8
Later the same year, Manning published this argument in his own series of case reports, albeit in much shorter form, in his report of Wynne v Wynne. 84 This was not a registration case but rather involved married women's property. As with the 1838 judgment, it was not necessary to have any discussion of the Littleton rule or
Manning's variation: the dispute concerned Sarah Wynne's rent-charge, which under the terms of the relevant trust was expressly for life unless a particular event happened
(which was not the mere will of the trustees). 85 Manning nonetheless makes the argument in the case report in a footnote.
As already noted, in the usual practical sense of resisting eviction, there would be no point in a rule converting a tenancy at will to a tenancy for life determinable at the grantor's will. In Manning's time, though, there would be a point, for a man, in terms of his ability to vote and, for a married woman, in terms of her control over property. Down to the late nineteenth century, a married woman's personal property became, in law, her husband's absolutely, whereas her real property vested in her and her husband jointly during the marriage. A life interest, even if determinable, was a freehold, and freeholds were classically real property, whereas leaseholds, let alone tenancies at will, were and technically still are personal property. At the same time, judges were, consciously or unconsciously, working within a framework of ideas in which there were not only, as described earlier, two views of the purpose of property qualifications but also more broadly two different views of the constitution. Crudely summarising one aspect of a complex and extensive literature:
in one view, what made the British constitution 'the "most perfect" ever devised' 91 was that it was 'organic' and had always evolved; in another, there was an ancient 'true' constitution which had been suppressed. To the extent that these views mapped onto party politics at all, it was radicals who were most likely to appeal to the idea of reviving an ancient constitution. 
Davis v Waddington (1844) 7 M&G 37
In Davis, the 25 appellants were inhabitants of Jesus Hospital-what we would call an almshouse-founded in 1597 to provide for 'poor and infirm men'. 95 Its charter, in Latin, gave its governors the power 'to elect' but also to 'expel' its principal or any of Reprinted apparently in full in the report, there was a long list of rules, some of them very odd, and a statement that inmates could be removed for breach, but no express statement either that the 'bedesmen' were appointed for life, or for a particular term, or that they were removable at anyone's will. 113 As in Davis, '[n]o person appointed ... as a bedesman, has ever been known to be removed during his life.' 114 Lord
Burghley's heirs, by this time Lord Exeter, appeared to remain the 'owner' of the hospital.
115
The objection had been on a number of grounds, including '[t]hat if the claimants had any freehold estate,' it was 'only as members of a corporation aggregate'-it was settled law that, if a corporation aggregate held a qualifying interest, that did not confer a vote on the corporation's members. 116 The revising barrister had rejected all of these arguments, holding 'that, under the circumstances, a legal foundation might be presumed, not necessarily investing the claimants with a corporate character, and that they were respectively entitled to a separate freehold estate in their respective rooms.'
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Counsel for the appellant attempted to argue that either the hospital was a corporation aggregate, such that the bedesmen were unqualified to vote, or 'it is a mere gratuitous act on the part of Lord Exeter to continue the charity; and consequently the bedesmen have no rights conferred upon them.' 118 Counsel then argued that some of the rules for breach of which a bedesman could be removed were so 'very singular' as to be tantamount to a power to remove at will. 
Beeson v Burton (1852) 12 CB 647
In the next eight years, a number of judgments followed the pattern established by Vict. c. 6, had made provisions for allotments. Under this Act, the resident freemen of Leicester elected deputies in whom the allotment land was vested on trust for the resident freemen. By s.17, the deputies had a power of sale, which, by s.22, was exercisable only with the consent of the majority of the resident freemen. There was no express provision that the allotments were to be held either for any particular term or for life subject to earlier termination; the Act said only, at s. thing as the Mexfield rule, and wrong in disapproving Zimbler. The real ratio of
Mexfield remains the same: although the court insisted that it preferred to get to the result by the alleged rule, it also held (with the greatest respect, correctly) that the relevant agreement, on ordinary principles of interpretation, was intended to be a determinable life tenancy; and only this reasoning was necessary to reach the result. 
